India's Foreign Policy, Great Power Relations and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict in 1962

The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 was an important event that occupies a prominent position in the history of the Cold War. It has long attracted the attention of academic circles at home and abroad for a long time. Regarding the origin of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, Chinese scholars mainly investigated the factors in India. They believed that Nehru insisted on military confrontation with China. First of all, the role of the two superpowers was the role of India. The prestige and international status have also been unprecedentedly improved. So Nehru had the illusion that he could get their support unconditionally. The second is Nehru’s erroneous assessment of China’s domestic situation. In Nehru’s view, China is in a state of slack or weak in terms of economy, politics, and military, and how can it withstand the development of China-India border areas? The second front? At the same time, Chinese scholars also analyzed factors in India's domestic politics, Nehru's personality and intelligence system. The Chinese diplomatic history works by Chinese officials emphasized that “after 1959, India and the United States supported the armed rebellion of a small number of upper-level reactionaries in Tibet and interfered in China’s internal affairs, and then coveted Chinese territory and provoked border conflicts.”[①]



  The Indian academic circles' research on the Sino-Indian border conflict, Rajesh Rajagopalan's viewpoint is representative. After more systematic use of information from India, he believes that Indian policy makers decided to "drive out" the Chinese army by force, mainly because Indian policy makers believed: First, for the implementation of India's "forward policy", China is only in the West. Actions in the disputed areas are not the case in the eastern section; second, China was facing various serious domestic and foreign problems at the time and would not attack India; third, India’s military power in the eastern section was stronger than China’s . Therefore, Indian policymakers believe that India can let go and take partial actions without risking the escalation of conflict. He also emphasized that the hostile relationship between China and the United States and the ongoing division between China and the Soviet Union have allowed India to form an informal and non-conflict relationship with the two superpowers to form a deterrent against China. But this is not a policy carefully planned by India, nor is it aware of the extent of the split between China and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union temporarily put aside its differences with China in order to gain support from China in the Cuban Missile Crisis, India's deterrence posture collapsed. To make matters worse, India did not realize the collapse of this deterrence posture. The deployment of the Indian army reflects a political belief that full-scale hostility with China is impossible. Therefore, the failure of the Indian policy was marked by the beginning of hostilities, not the defeat of the Indian army. He also analyzed the "vital role" played by the Cuban missile crisis in facilitating China's decision to take military action. [②]

  In other more important studies by Indian scholars, CVRanganathan and Vinod C. Khanna believe that due to the domestic difficulties in China, the failure of the Great Leap Forward led to a nationwide famine and other difficulties. , Chinese leaders have taken military actions abroad to maintain the people’s trust in their rule. Chinese leaders hope to show the world the efficiency of their government system and economic development through such military actions. China also hopes to use military actions to obstruct India’s economic development plan and undermine India’s democratic system. They focused on the impact of the changes in Sino-Soviet relations on Sino-Indian relations, and pointed out that the Soviet Union has been concerned about Sino-Indian relations since 1959, and the neutral position adopted by the Soviet Union was one of the reasons for the split between China and the Soviet Union. They emphasized that Mao Zedong expressed strong and firm opposition to Khrushchev's view of international relations after Stalin's death, which had a very negative impact on India. Therefore, "In Mao Zedong's view, the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India indicate that all errors were caused by the Soviet Union." China especially wanted to show the Soviet Union: India’s non-alignment is a myth, and India is actually a follower of the Western camp. Therefore, the Soviet Union’s policy of maintaining friendly relations with non-aligned countries is wrong. [③] On this issue, Purnendu Kumar Banerjee, who served as the Chargé d’affaires of the Indian Embassy in China during the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, also held the same view. The successful experience of the Chinese revolution convinced Mao Zedong that the international communist movement Leadership should be transferred from Moscow to Beijing, and from Khrushchev to Mao Zedong. In order to achieve this goal, Mao Zedong’s first focus was on those countries in Asia and Africa that had the same economic and political conditions as China. The first goal was to choose India, the largest country with the geographical location closest to China and the most influential. "Offensive and subversion are the first steps of Mao’s strategy. If India collapses, the Communist Party of India will seize power, and other Asian countries will follow this model." [④]

  And Russian scholars especially led to the changes in Sino-Soviet relations. The reasons for the split between China and the Soviet Union studied the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962; they emphasized that the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban missile crisis were a "turning point" in the development of Sino-Soviet relations, marking the beginning of an open rupture of relations between the two countries. [⑤]

  Judging from the above-mentioned academic development history, the arguments of the academic circles in China and India are completely opposite. It is particularly noteworthy that the newly declassified diplomatic archives of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as relevant materials on China and India in recent years, provide a valuable insight for the exploration of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 from the perspective of a broader international history. Historical data basis. By re-examining the essence of India's foreign policy after its independence, it can be seen that the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 was the inevitable result of Nehru's foreign policy. Similarly, the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 embodies the theory and practice of China's "revolutionary diplomacy" since the mid to late 1950s, rather than a simple border issue. Behind the border conflict, what was revealed was the fundamental differences between China and the Soviet Union on a series of major theoretical and international strategic issues, which became an important content of the Sino-Soviet debate and an important cause and sign of the Sino-Soviet split. Therefore, the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 was not only a military conflict between China and India in the border area, but also had a broader significance for the Cold War and relations between major powers.

  The Essence of India's Diplomacy after Independence and India's Policy on the Sino-Indian Border Issue

  Regarding the evaluation of India’s foreign policy after its independence, the general research believes that Nehru’s deep suspicion of the West and the uncertainty of the United States’ response to Asian nationalism are therefore for Nehru. , Adopting a policy of non-alignment becomes a logical choice. [⑥] From a period of time after the war, Nehru really hoped to implement this policy. In January 1947, Nehru emphasized the basic principles of Indian diplomacy in instructions to his chief aide in foreign affairs and the ambassador to China KPS Menon (KPSMenon). Nehru said: "Our basic policy is to avoid being entangled in the politics of major powers and not to join any major power group. The two leading groups in the world today are the Russian group and the American group. We must be friendly to both without joining any party. In addition to the extreme suspicion of each other, the United States and the Soviet Union also doubt other countries. This makes our policy choices more difficult. They will suspect that we are inclined to one side, which is of no benefit to India. Our foreign policy is fundamentally It depends on our domestic policy. This policy is definitely not against communism. On the contrary, it clearly opposes the Communist Party of India. However, in India, there is not only a strong and rising vague sentiment in favor of the socialist social order. And there is a deep friendship with the United States, and we expect the United States to help India in many fields, especially in the field of science and technology. The Soviet Union is our neighbor, and we will be destined to have a close relationship with it. We cannot be hostile to Russia because of the dissatisfaction of other countries. , Of course, we cannot be hostile to the United States." As for the relationship with China, Nehru believes that China and India will "continue to be friendly."[⑦] But he is obviously aware of the possibility of conflict between India and China. Nehru expressed this concern shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. He said: “Since the Chinese revolution, we have naturally had to consider the appearance of the new China. We realize that this revolution is in Asia and the whole world. The world and ourselves are a major event. History tells us that a strong China generally advocates external expansion. Considering that once China becomes strong, it will generate internal expansion momentum. We have realized that India The dangers we face will become more and more apparent over time. If anyone thinks that we did not recognize this danger when implementing policies, then he would be very wrong."[⑧]

  From a practical point of view, Nehru’s above-mentioned policies mainly serve two strategic goals: India’s status as a major power and national security. Nehru made a clear statement on this in March 1946. He pointed out: The center stage of the world is shifting from Europe to Asia. India is located between the East and the West. This geo-strategic position makes it in the relationship between East and West countries. It plays a very important role in this, becoming a meeting point of different ideas and strengths between the East and the West. At the same time, Nehru also emphasized, “Some countries may covet India, but other countries will act to prevent this possibility. No country will allow other countries to obtain the right to rule India. If there is an aggression, all other countries will It will stop and defeat the aggressor, and this kind of confrontation itself is the best guarantee for preventing India from aggression." [9]

  However, the domestic situation in India, especially the development of the Cold War, has had a significant impact on India's diplomacy. The first is the unprecedented famine and economic difficulties in India in the early postwar period, which forced India to request economic assistance from Western countries, especially the United States. But what is important is the reasons that India put forward when requesting U.S. assistance. On February 26, 1947, India’s Ambassador to the United States, Asaf Ali, called on US Secretary of State George Marshall and asked the United States to provide India with economic and food assistance. Ali said, “If India becomes stronger, it will become a fortress in the world against the powerful northern neighboring country that has cast its shadow over the Eurasian continent... Since India is surrounded by weak countries on the left and right, India can Become a powerful center for these weak countries."[⑩]

  In order to further deepen the West, especially the United States’ understanding of the essence of India’s foreign policy, Nehru emphasized in his speech on India’s foreign policy on March 18, 1948: “Due to the uncertainty of changes in the situation, we may have to I have a choice, or even choose to form an alliance with an imperialist country. I don’t shy away from it. As long as this imperialist country is less guilty than another.” Before that, Nehru instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write to the United States. The ambassador to India, Henry Grady, emphasized that once a world war breaks out, it is unthinkable for India to join the Soviet Union. [11] On March 20, India’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Vijay Laxmi Pandit, was ordered to meet with the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, and emphasized the extreme dissatisfaction of the Nehru government with the Soviet Union’s support of the Communist Party of India. Mrs. Pandit said, “Nehru and most of the leaders of India have decided to maintain a natural alliance with the West, but they are limited by many factors, such as geographical restrictions and military weakness. Therefore, Nehru We cannot openly discuss the issue of joining the West in the military." Mrs. Pandit also emphasized that if the United States can assist India in solving domestic difficulties, India will be able to play a greater role in the international community. [12] In April 1948, when Indian Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs Girja Shankar Bajpai visited the United States, he repeatedly expressed India’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union and called on the United States to support India. According to Nehru’s instructions, Bajpay explained in particular that the reason why India could not form an alliance with the United States was because of fear of the threat of the Soviet Union and out of domestic political considerations. He said that the United States is wrong to regard India as a member of the Soviet camp. Once a war breaks out, "India can only fight shoulder to shoulder with those countries that believe in freedom and democracy." And the United States is the only country that can assist India. [13] Bajpay also made it clear to Ambassador Grady: India’s neutrality is more inclined to the United States. [14]

  In order to obtain aid from the United States as soon as possible, Nehru strongly advocated signing a commercial and aviation treaty with the United States in 1948. In order to promote the negotiation process, Nehru instructed in August 1948: "The United States is the most powerful and wealthy country in the world, so it has the ability to give India a great help. There is no reason why we should not get such help. And to eliminate the root cause of friction between us.” He also told VK Menon (VKMenon), a senior aide with strong anti-American sentiment and India’s ambassador to the United Nations, in January 1949: “Why don’t we allied with the United States to strengthen What about our own economic and military power?” [15] Nehru undoubtedly believed that “fate and situation have placed a huge responsibility on the shoulders of the United States. Similarly, destiny and situation have placed India in a special place in Asia. In order to further develop the relationship between the two countries, Nehru decided to visit the United States in October 1949 and took more active actions against the United States. Nehru appointed his sister, Mrs. Pandit, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union, as the ambassador to the United States in April 1949. At the same time, he also relaxed the restrictions on US and British investment in India. On April 22, Nehru gave a speech at the Indian People's Chamber, publicly indicating that India will be more inclined to the United States. Nehru pointed out: "When I said that we should not ally with any big power group, it is obvious that this does not mean that our relations with these countries are completely the same. As you can see at present, we are in fact the same The relationship between certain countries in the Western world is much closer than the relationship with other countries. It is partly due to historical reasons and partly due to other factors. This kind of intimate relationship will undoubtedly be further developed, and we will do our best to promote this kind of relationship. The development of relationships."[17]

  The Soviet Union's foreign policy towards India in the early days of the Cold War also led to a large extent Nehru's fall to the United States. Nehru hoped that after independence, India would develop relations with the Soviet Union. In 1946, he called the Soviet Union "our neighbor in Asia" and should engage in "common tasks and more cooperation with each other." [18] However, during the Stalin period, Soviet diplomacy divided the enemy and ourselves in two camps, so the diplomacy with India obviously contained ideological factors. [19] In December 1947, the "Bolshevik" magazine published an article by E. Zhukov, a well-known Soviet expert on India, calling on the Communist Party of India to lead India's national liberation movement through a broad united front. The Soviet leaders obviously believed that India was not pursuing a neutral policy of "non-alignment". A 1949 article in Pravda clearly pointed out that the Nehru government gradually turned India into "the military police of British and American imperialism in the East." [20] The economic relations between the Soviet Union and India during Stalin's period clearly reflected the basic orientation of the Soviet Union's policy toward India during this period. The Soviet Union's imports from India dropped from 16.2 million U.S. dollars in 1948 to 700,000 U.S. dollars in 1953; during the same period, the Soviet Union's exports to India also fell from 9.8 million U.S. dollars to 900,000 U.S. dollars. [twenty one]

  The knowledge and understanding of communism is an important reason for Nehru to implement the above-mentioned policies. He has publicly stated his opposition to communism on many occasions. Nehru once clearly pointed out: he hates communism, "despite its remarkable achievements, but because of its rigidity, especially because it ignores certain basic human requirements, it will still fail. The Communists are right. The contradictions of the capitalist society have been discussed a lot, and their analysis is reasonable. But we have seen that the contradictions within the rigid framework of communism itself are growing day by day. Its suppression of individual freedom has caused a strong reactionary momentum. The communists despised it. It can be called the moral and spiritual aspects of life. They not only ignore the basic things of man, but also undermine man’s code of conduct and belittle its value. The unfortunate connection between communism and violence encourages certain harmful tendencies. Based on this concept, with Nehru’s acquiescence, the Indian provinces declared the Communist Party of India an illegal organization, closed its publications, and arrested its leaders and a large number of party members. Nehru also condemned the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian incident, saying that the dignity and freedom of the Hungarian people had been trampled; at the same time, the spirit of the principle of peaceful coexistence was also undermined by the use of force to suppress the people and achieve political goals. [22] During his visit to the United States in December 1956 to meet with Eisenhower, Nehru publicly declared: "The Budapest uprising sounded the death knell of international communism." [23]

  More importantly, Nehru linked his opposition to colonialism with "resisting the expansion of communism in Asia." Nehru told U.S. officials that India’s response to colonial rule was not directed at the United States, because opposing colonialism in Asia is a good strategy against communism. “If India cannot play a leading role in the struggle to eliminate the last remnants of European imperialism. The Soviet Union will do so, and the result will be the spread of communism in Asia." [24] When Nehru and Marshall met in Paris in 1948, they repeatedly emphasized that India can become an important force for stability in Asia. Nehru pointed out: “India working for itself is working for Asia, especially considering the catastrophic development of the situation in China.” Nehru emphasized India’s close relations with Myanmar, Ceylon, and Indonesia, as well as for these countries. Strong influence. He said that he has a clear understanding of the influence of communism in Asia. If he does not resolutely oppose colonialism, the influence of the Soviet Union will be further strengthened. [25] On December 17, 1948, India’s ambassador to the United States, Lama Rau, asked the United States to provide loans and goods to U.S. officials that, due to developments in China, India “has been seriously concerned about the expansion of communism. "Only economic development in India can stop this trend of expansion. When Bajpayee met with the new US ambassador to India, Loy Wesley Henderson, on December 22, he emphasized that: “India’s democratic system” and “the collapse of the Chinese government” have made India a major factor in the stability of Asia. India should Occupying a "logical position" in international affairs, he also reiterated that India hopes to cooperate with the United States in Asia. [26]

  At the same time, the non-alignment policy also has a substantially different meaning for Nehru. In the joint communiqué issued by Yugoslav President Tito’s visit to India from the end of 1954 to the beginning of 1955 with Nehru, the two parties stated that they pursued a “non-alignment policy” and emphasized that this policy is not “neutrality” or “neutralism” but “a kind of neutrality”. A positive, affirmative, and constructive policy, it seeks collective peace, and only it can truly realize collective security." As for the basic meaning of non-alignment, Nehru believed that he did not participate in the big power group. If given a positive meaning, it was aimed at opposing alliances for the purpose of war. [27] In a meeting with Eisenhower during his visit to the United States in December 1956, Nehru explained India's "neutrality" policy. Nehru said that neutrality is not an unprincipled indifference between a government based on autocracy and a government based on democracy. India will have a choice when necessary. The reason why India is friendly with the Soviet Union and China is not because of its own interests, but because of the needs of India's national security.

  Nehru emphasized that India and China have a border of 1,800 miles. Guarding such a long border will exhaust the country's resources. It is certainly impossible to improve the people's living standards to prevent the Communist Party of India from coming to power. In addition, alliances with the West will weaken the United States and its allies, because India is unable to defend itself, and the burden will fall on allies. [28] Therefore, after long-term consideration and bargaining with Britain, India finally decided to join the Commonwealth in April 1949. In this regard, Nehru said: "If we are completely separated from the Federation, then we will be completely isolated for a while. We cannot be completely isolated for a long time, so it is inevitable that we will inevitably be forced by the environment to lean towards a certain aspect or Other aspects. That kind of dumping to one aspect or another must be based on reciprocity... In other words, this may require us to assume more obligations than we currently have." [29] For the United States, given India’s long-term previous Anti-British stance, neutralism and anti-colonial policy, India's entry into the Commonwealth to a large extent shows that Nehru is openly leaning to the side of the Western bloc. The New York Times praised India’s decision as a “historical step... it not only promoted the Commonwealth, but also restricted the expansion of communism, thus opening up a broader defense prospect than the Atlantic.” The Soviet Union added India to Britain. The Federation regarded Nehru as another proof of his refuge in the West and believed that Nehru "has already made deals with British imperialism and Indian reactionaries to attack the Indian people." [30]

  As far as the US strategy is concerned, containing China is an important consideration for the US to develop relations with India. A sentence from Dulles can clearly show the essence of the US policy towards India in the early days of the Cold War. Dulles pointed out: "India is the largest autonomous country in the world. It has a common border of about 2,000 miles with the Communist Party of China. Now there is a competition between the two countries: whether the free method or the police state method can achieve better This kind of competition directly affects the 800 million people of these two countries, and its results will eventually affect the entire human race, including ourselves. Appropriately continue to give India some kind of technical assistance and materials to enable it to complete Its five-year plan is fully in our interest." [31] Kennedy paid more attention to developing relations with India. He published an article in 1958 and pointed out: Among all the third world countries, India has successfully chosen the path of development under a democratic system, "If India collapses, the entire Asia will be lost." Kennedy also emphasized that if India splits or joins the communist camp with China, then "the free world will no longer be a free world." [32] More importantly, Kennedy believes that "the struggle between India and China is The two countries are fighting economically and politically for the leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, and for looking for opportunities to prove whose way of life is better. The result of this struggle will greatly affect the future of Asia as a whole. It affects the balance of power between the Communist country and the free country, and it will inevitably affect the security and status of our country." Kennedy emphasized: "We hope India will win this competition with the Communist China. We hope India will become a free and prosperous Asia. The leader of freedom and prosperity."[33]

  Therefore, the relationship between the United States and India developed greatly during the Eisenhower and Kennedy era. In early 1957, the National Security Council of the United States approved the National Security Council Document No. 5701 for large-scale assistance to India. When Eisenhower approved this document, he emphasized: "The basic goal of American foreign aid is to provide assistance to non-Communist governments to prevent them from falling into Soviet rule. If we do not aid countries like India, Soviet Russia will certainly do that. "[34] In early March 1958, the United States announced a loan of US$225 million to India. During Kennedy's tenure, the United States further developed its relations with India. In May 1961, the US Congress allocated US$500 million to aid India’s economic development. During John K. Galbraith's tenure as ambassador to India, the United States provided approximately $670 million in economic aid to India each year. Kennedy stated that he could not see "how to deal with Communist China without India." [35] At the same time, the pro-India forces in the Kennedy administration are also very strong. Officials of the State Department emphasized that India is an asset for the strategic interests of the United States. If handled properly, the United States will establish facts with the second largest country in the world. The alliance relationship between China and China, under appropriate circumstances, even makes it an official ally; in this way, India’s approximately 1 million troops will help alleviate the CCP’s pressure on Southeast Asia. [36]

  The rapid development of India's relations with the United States and the changes in the Soviet Union's policy towards India during the Khrushchev era directly led to Nehru's strong stance on the Sino-Indian border issue. As early as when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet, relevant Indian decision-makers believed that as a result of China’s action, the Chinese "almost came to our door", thus posing a serious threat to India. The defense at the border was prepared early. [37] For this reason, the Indian ambassador to China Sardar Panikkar envisaged that India would recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet in exchange for China’s recognition of the McMahon Line. Pannica suggested to Nehru: If China raises border issues in the future, the best course of action is to refuse to discuss border issues and adopt the official position that Nehru has publicly declared, that is, on the Indian side of the McMahon Line. Territory is not the subject of discussion. [38] By 1954, Nehru had decided to adopt the above-mentioned method to deal with the entire northern border, not just the eastern section. The maps published by India reflected this policy. Soon after the signing of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Transportation between China’s Tibet and India, Nehru instructed the relevant departments: India’s attitude towards the northern border should be “firm and clear, and should not be discussed with anyone. One question. The border post system should be extended to the entire northern border. More importantly, we should also set up posts in areas that are considered disputed."[39]

  Under the guidance of this kind of thinking, on November 2, 1961, the Indian decision-making stratum finally formed the directive concerning the "forward policy", which mainly contained the following three important contents: "1. Regarding Ladakh, we must move forward from our current position. Keep patrolling forward as far as possible along the international border. The purpose of this is to establish our outposts to prevent China from moving forward and prevent China from using any outposts they have established in our territory to exercise control. In this way In doing so, in addition to the necessity of self-defense, we must avoid conflicts with the Chinese army. Second, in Uttar Pradesh and other northern regions, it is not as difficult as Ladakh. Therefore, we should move forward according to the actual possibility and move the entire border The area should be effectively occupied. If there is any gap, it must be filled by patrols or establishment of outposts. 3. In view of the many difficulties in military operations and administrative management, efforts should be made to concentrate forces along the borders of our country and be appropriately stationed behind the forward posts. So that these outposts can receive logistical supplies, and once notified, they can immediately go to the border to restore the situation there.” [40]

  Subsequently, India stepped up its military deployment to implement this policy. At a joint meeting between the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1962, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ratan Kumar Nehru, stated that the government’s position is, “We must never accept any complaints about the Northeast Frontier Special Zone. Infringement of the border of the country’s borders", and at the same time, we should strengthen the power of the Doral region, "to drive the Chinese out of our territory, even at the cost of the Chinese’s response in our weak Ladakh region, otherwise we will Lose more territory.” Army Chief of Staff Tapal asked at the time to record the order to “drive the Chinese out of Dora.” [41] In this way, from 1959 to 1962, the Indian side established a total of 43 outposts in the Sino-Indian border area.

  On the other hand, the Indian side sought US diplomatic support and military assistance long before the Sino-Indian border conflict. After U.S. Senator Willy Smith visited India in May 1959, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Nehru and his close advisers had expressed concerns about China in their meetings with him. [42] Although the U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter has hinted that the U.S. has a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the China-India border issue on the merits of India and China’s respective demands. [43] But the cold war strategy of the United States made the United States adopt a position of fully supporting India. When Eisenhower visited India at the end of 1959, he assured Nehru that in the event of a conflict between India and China, the United States would take strong measures to ensure that Pakistan remained neutral. In March 1961, Nehru made it clear to visiting Harriman (Averell Harriman) that "the danger to the world comes from Beijing, not from Moscow." He also emphasized that China's aggressive intentions are at the peak and the situation is dangerous. When Deputy Secretary of State Bowles (Chester Bowles) visited India in March 1962, he met with General Kaul (BM Kaul), who was actively pursuing the "forward policy." Kaul asked Bowers: Will the United States provide military assistance to India in the event of an open Chinese invasion? Bowles replied that he personally believed that the United States would provide assistance. For this reason, Kaur asked the United States to send senior military officers to visit India secretly, and the two sides negotiated to prepare an emergency plan for the above situation.

  [44] On October 12, Kaul further stated in his talks with U.S. Ambassador Galbraith that India intends to drive Chinese troops out of Indian territory, but Nehru and Menon have not yet fully understood the difficulty of this task. This Kaur emphasized that "this task can only be accomplished with the help of the United States." In order to obtain aid from the United States, Kaul even told the American ambassador that he had persuaded the government to abandon its commitment to the non-alignment policy. [45] On October 18, Nehru had a meeting with Galbraith after returning from Ceylon, and emphasized that India had decided to drive the Chinese army out of Indian territory, whether it would take one year, five years or ten. Time of year. Nehru pointed out that India will not use all its forces, mainly "using ground forces to maintain long-term pressure on China." This measure will also be extended to the western section of the Sino-Indian border. Galbraith said that the United States supports Nehru's policy. [46]

  The Tibetan rebellion, border issues, and changes

  in Sino-Indian relations   China’s policy towards India first reflects the development and changes of the CCP’s policy towards nationalist countries in the context of the Cold War, especially the practice of Mao Zedong’s "middle zone" theory. The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China initially hoped that India would also follow the victory of the Chinese revolution as an example. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, BTRanadive, the general secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India, sent a telegram of congratulations. Mao Zedong said in his reply: The Chinese people believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not succumb to the rule of imperialism and its lackeys for a long time. Mao Zedong also emphasized in his reply that, like liberated China, a free India will one day appear in the big family of socialism and democracy. [47] At that time, China compared Nehru with Bao Dai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Li Chengman, and called it "the dregs of mankind."

  Due to India’s initiative in its China policy in the early days of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and China’s foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence" after the end of the Korean War, especially Mao Zedong’s understanding of the "middle zone" during this period, Sino-Indian relations began to enter the so-called so-called The "honeymoon period". During the four meetings with Nehru in October 1954, Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized the friendly relations between China and India. Mao Zedong pointed out: "Although we are different in our ideology and social system, we have one big thing in common, that is, we all have to deal with imperialism." Mao Zedong classified India into the third category of countries, that is, "being" The oppressive nations and countries are not led by the Communist Party, but by patriotic groups and political parties."[48]

  Regarding the nature of countries like India, Mao Zedong clearly pointed out in a speech in September 1958: "I said in "On New Democracy" that after the Second World War, it is impossible to have a Kimar-like Turkey; The bourgeoisie in colonial and semi-colonial countries should follow imperialism or socialism. There is no third case. In fact, this view is only suitable for some countries, such as China and Turkey. For India, Indonesia, Countries such as the United Arab Republic are not applicable. They are not imperialist countries, nor socialist countries, but nationalist countries. There are many such countries in Latin America, and there will be more in the future... These countries neither stand in imperialist On one side, instead of standing on the side of socialism, but standing in a neutral position and not participating in the group of both sides, this is suitable for their current situation...The third position can be maintained for a considerable period of time, and it is necessary to maintain it. Time.” Mao Zedong regarded this neutral policy as “an independent and uncontrolled position.” China welcomes this position because it is conducive to the cause of peace and not conducive to imperialist aggression plans and war plans. [49] In some subsequent talks, Mao Zedong further pointed out that now the United States and the Soviet Union are fighting for the middle ground, and the main places for the imperialist countries to compete are in Asia and Africa. He proposed: "Communism, nationalism, imperialism Among these three doctrines, communism and nationalism are relatively close." [50] Chen Yi also emphasized in the same period: "Asian and African countries are a pivotal code on the balance. This code is placed on imperialism, and they are more important. , We are light; put it on our side, we are heavy, they are light.” Chen Yi also clearly pointed out: the middle zone includes Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as European capitalist countries with a neutral tendency... this middle The zone is undergoing a fierce revolution and is currently one of the important links that determines the fate of the world. Chen Yi especially emphasized that nationalism is the main middle ground of the middle ground. [51] Based on this understanding, Chen Yi once praised the Indian representative KPS Menon who participated in the Geneva Conference as "a friend of a socialist country and an excellent negotiator." Regarding India’s occupation of Goa, although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stated that China is a peace-loving country and does not believe that military actions can solve international problems, it emphasized that China will do its best to end colonialism. [52] Therefore, China's policy toward India at that time was precisely the basic judgment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the nature of a nationalist country and the practice of the "middle zone" theory.

  Even in the "honeymoon period" of Sino-Indian relations, China began to re-understand Nehru's non-aligned "neutrality" policy from India's attitude on a series of major issues involving China's diplomacy. India’s role in North Korea’s armistice negotiations, especially India’s proposal at the United Nations on the repatriation of prisoners of war, was regarded by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as "ridiculous and illegal." [53] During the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, Nehru made it clear to the US ambassador to India in early November 1958 that he firmly opposed China's attempt to seize coastal islands by force. [54] Based on these Indian policies, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China began to believe that “Nehru had done something beneficial to world peace in a period of time... But even in this period, Nehru was very helpful to imperialism. In particular, the major aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism are rarely opposed, but they continue to attack the just struggles of the people of all countries and the socialist countries. On many major and key issues of international affairs, Nehru often stands on the imperial side. The ideological side basically adopts a policy of “small criticism and big help” towards imperialism.” [55] China particularly strongly criticizes India’s representatives in the United Nations for fully following the policies of Western countries and supporting Western countries in Hungary, North Korea, and China. The power politics on the issue determines that India is further moving closer to the imperialist reactionaries in this way. [56] Therefore, although Mao Zedong thought in May 1959: "India is not our enemy, but our friend. China will not be so stupid. The East makes enemies against the United States, and the West makes enemies against India." At the same time emphasized: "Those principled positions, those right and wrong boundaries, must be said, not to mention that it can not solve the current differences between us."[57]

  It was the Tibet rebellion in 1959 and the subsequent Sino-Indian border conflict that led to a fundamental change in the leadership of the CPC Central Committee’s understanding of Indian diplomacy and Nehru. However, the contradictions and conflicts existed when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet in 1950. Just showing up. In view of historical reasons, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China fully considered India's response when making the decision of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet. Mao Zedong instructed in August 1950 that, because "India has issued a statement recognizing Tibet as Chinese territory, but hopes for a peaceful settlement not to use force," the central government "is adopting a policy of obtaining Tibetan representatives to come to Beijing and reducing Nehru's fear." [58] However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China took a firm stand on the issue of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s entry into Tibet, and informed the Indian government: “The Chinese army must reach all places in Tibet where it should go. Regardless of whether the Tibetan government is willing to negotiate or not and the outcome of the negotiations, any foreign There is no room for bidding.” [59] Regarding the

  Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s entry into Tibet, India gave consecutive notes to the Chinese government on October 21, October 28, and November 1, 1950, to express its position. In these notes, India insisted, “At present, when the international situation is so delicate, any action that may be interpreted as disrupting peace will damage China’s position in the eyes of the world.” Therefore, “The Indian government should know the Chinese government. When military actions have been taken against a peaceful nation, I am even more surprised. There is no corroboration that the Tibetans have taken any provocative actions or resorted to non-peaceful methods. Therefore, in any case, such military actions were taken against them. There is no reason." India even claimed: "Recent developments in Tibet have affected" the "friendship between India and China and the interests of world peace." [60] In the eyes of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, India’s response was undoubtedly interference in China’s internal affairs and the continuation of imperialist policies, which led to a re-evaluation of India’s entire foreign policy by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

  There is no doubt that the Tibetan rebellion in 1959 led to a fundamental change in the views of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on India’s foreign policy and Nehru. The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that the Tibet issue is essentially the last fierce and serious class struggle in mainland China. "India also has the illusion that we are afraid of a nationalist country." [61]

  On March 17, 1959, Zhou Enlai said at the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee that the Tibetan rebellion was related to the Indian authorities. The British and American governments were very active behind the scenes, supporting the Indian authorities and pushing India to the forefront. The command center of the rebellion was in Kalimpong, India. [62] The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that Nehru and the upper-class people in India are very afraid of reforms in Tibet and oppose reforms, even saying that reforms are impossible. "This has caused them to interfere in our internal affairs and violate the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." They hope that Tibet will remain backward for a long time and become a "buffer country" between China and India. This is their leading thought and the center of dispute between China and India. Therefore, this struggle was provoked by the Tibetan rebel group at home and by a part of the big bourgeoisie in India internationally... Nehru also understood that their actions would not change Tibet’s counterinsurgency, and reform must be carried out. , The "buffer country" is also disillusioned. The rest is the Cold War. They want to use the Cold War and political pressure to organize a triangular meeting of India, China, and Tibet to interfere in China's internal affairs. It is impossible for India to realize this kind of idea, but it has not given up and is still trying. This road must be blocked. [63] The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also emphasized: “We must fight back against India. This is what they provoked. They engaged in the Cold War, and we must use their own way to rule them back. The strategy of struggle must be rational and powerful. , There is discipline, there is unity, there is struggle, to strive for unity. On the Tibet issue, Nehru may have the illusion that he wants to use the Dalai Lama to bargain. When our army entered Tibet in 1950, India explicitly intervened. Because of this. The victory of our army in Qamdo required the upper strata of Tibet to negotiate and India to give up. Now our army has moved to the border and closed the door to quell the chaos. We must fight back. They may set aside the Tibet issue and set off an anti-communist and anti-Chinese climax. We must be ideologically prepared."[64] When Mao Zedong put down the Tibetan rebellion, he said: Now it is for the Indian authorities to do more unrighteousness, and we will settle accounts with it at a certain time. Regarding Nehru, Mao Zedong made it clear: "We must criticize him sharply, not afraid of irritating him, not afraid of falling out with him, and fighting to the end." [65] Mao Zedong even pointed out that there are many ghosts in the world today. There are a large group of ghosts in the Western world, that is, imperialism. There are also large groups of ghosts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, namely imperialist running dogs and reactionaries. Mao Zedong emphasized, "What is Nehru? He is a centrist of the Indian bourgeoisie, and he is different from the rightists.... The Tibet issue has become a world issue. This is a big issue. It will take a long time. It’s okay to make trouble for half a year, but it’s better to make trouble for a year. Unfortunately, India doesn’t dare to do it.... Nowadays, there are a lot of troubles in the Tibet issue. Good thing, let the ghost come out, I am very welcome. "[66] After the Tibet rebellion in 1959, Mao Zedong clearly instructed: "Imperialism, the Chiang gang and foreign reactionaries instigated the Tibetan rebellion and interfered in China’s internal affairs." This statement has been talked for a long time and it is all improper. It must be taken immediately and corrected. For "British imperialists and Indian expansionists are embarrassed, openly interfering in China's internal affairs, in a vain attempt to take Tibet over." Point directly to Britain and India, don't dodge.[67]

  The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that India is undoubtedly supporting the Tibetan rebellion. In their view, Nehru believes that the Dalai Lama will play a huge role in the plans of the Indians, and Tibet will have rebellion without the Dalai Lama. But it turned out to be the opposite. Without the Dalai Lama, things in Tibet would do better. [68] When Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi met with Raku Nehru on July 16, 1961, China’s position was clearly expressed: India should not allow the Dalai clique to engage in activities against the motherland there. [69] The

  border issue is another important issue that caused the Central Committee of the Communist Party to re-understand Nehru's foreign policy. According to information from India, when Nehru visited China in October 1954, he drew China's attention to the delineation of the disputed area on the Sino-Indian border on China's map. When Zhou Enlai returned to India in 1956, Nehru once again drew the attention of the Chinese side to this issue. At that time, Zhou Enlai replied that although China opposed the McMahon Line, China had accepted this line as the border between China and Myanmar. After preparing to make some changes, China also accepted this line as the China-India boundary line. [70] But this statement was later denied and severely refuted by Zhou Enlai.

  In view of the fundamental differences between China and India on the border issue, Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru on January 23, 1959, clarifying China's basic position on the Sino-Indian border issue, and proposed the primary measures to resolve the issue. Zhou En said that when the Agreement on Trade and Transportation between China's Tibet and India was signed in 1954, the time to discuss the border issue was not ripe. Zhou Enlai emphasized that the China-India boundary has never been formally demarcated. China proposes to comprehensively resolve the Sino-Indian boundary issue through friendly consultations; before a comprehensive settlement, the two sides maintain the long-existing state of the boundary, and can discuss temporary disputes that have already occurred. Solution. Nehru replied to his letter on March 22, disagreeing with Zhou Enlai's statement that the China-India boundary had never been formally demarcated in the above-mentioned letter, and requested the Chinese government to formally recognize the boundary line formed during the British rule in India, and emphasized that the Indian map was marked. "There is no room for doubt." [71]

  On December 26, 1959, the Chinese government's note to the Indian Embassy in China on the China-India boundary issue once again fully explained the Chinese government's position on the China-India boundary issue. The main contents of the note are as follows: 1. Has the China-India boundary been officially delimited? The note pointed out: "The entire Sino-Indian border, regardless of the western, central and eastern sections, has not been demarcated... The Sino-Indian border has yet to be demarcated, which has been recognized by the Indian and British governments over a long period of time. Undoubted evidence.” 2. Where is the traditional customary line on the Sino-Indian border? The note stated: “Although the border between China and India has not been formally demarcated, both sides recognize that there is a traditional customary line. This is the boundary formed based on the historical jurisdiction of the two parties.” The difference is that “the Chinese government’s traditional customary line Views, whether in the west, middle, or east, are based on objective facts and are proved by a large amount of factual data. However, the boundary line marked on the map of India, except that most of the middle section is in line with reality, other fundamentals It does not represent the traditional customary line. The boundary line between the east and the west can be seen beyond doubt as the product of the aggressive and expansionary policy of British modern history. "3. What is the correct way to resolve the border dispute between China and India? The note pointed out: "The Chinese government has always maintained that: China and India should consider the historical background and current actual conditions, and in accordance with the five principles, through friendly consultations, comprehensively resolve the border issue between the two countries; prior to this, as a temporary measure, both sides The status quo of the border should be maintained, and neither one-sided actions nor the use of force should be allowed to change this status quo; for some disputes, a partial and temporary agreement can also be reached through negotiation." The note clearly pointed out that China and India are currently The two key issues that urgently need to be resolved are: the entire border between the two countries has never been demarcated and needs to be resolved through negotiations; before the border is officially delimited, the status quo of the border between the two countries must be effectively maintained and the stability of the border must be ensured. . [72] Regarding this note, Mao Zedong once instructed that “all organizations at all levels of the party and the regiment should read and discuss it once.” [73] Mao Zedong later said: “They thought that the Chinese would not beat them anyway, so they just Step by step to the north of the McMahon Line, sometimes even behind us, walking around casually. At this time our Prime Minister and Chief of Staff were angry and bullied too much and decided to beat him."[ 74]

  The Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian boundary issue not only caused the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to re-recognize Nehru’s foreign policy, but more importantly, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, especially Mao Zedong’s influence on the "middle zone" theory and the role of the nationalist state. Rethinking, thus establishing the corresponding guidelines and policies, and directly affect the policy towards India.

  The leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that India provoked the quarrel over the Sino-Indian border issue. “If we take a concession to Nehru, not only will he be more reactionary, but he will feel that he is right, we are wrong, and whitewash him. We cannot adopt this kind of policy. What we adopt is to criticize him and then seek unity; expose his mistakes and reactionary side so that the people can see clearly. The other It may be that he relaxes, shrinks, and continues to reconcile with the socialist countries." [75] In the eyes of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, India has begun to become "reactionary nationalism." Mao Zedong clearly pointed out in December 1959: The reactionary forces against China have two advantages: one is to expose the face of the reactionaries and lose their prestige in front of the people; the other is to arouse the awakening of most people in the world and they will see a reactionary empire. Doctrine, nationalism, and revisionism are enemies, liars, and illicit goods, while China’s banner is bright red. [76] He emphasized: “World imperialism, reactionary nationalism, Yugoslav revisionism and its allies in various countries, in short, all the reactionaries and their lackeys who exploit and oppress the people are no more than hundreds of millions of people in the world. It accounts for less than 10%, while the revolutionary people and their allies account for more than 90%, reaching as many as two billion people. There is no doubt. The Indian reactionaries are anti-China, and the Indian people are not anti-China. They I hate the reactionaries of my country."[77] Mao Zedong clearly pointed out at the end of February 1962: "The imperialist groups headed by the United States, the reactionaries such as Nehru, and the modern revisionists are performing a new anti-China chorus.

  This The anti-Chinese chorus is very unpopular, with few listeners, no matter how hard they sing, in the final analysis, it is impossible to sing a big name. In other words, they cannot prevent the promotion and development of Marxism-Leninism in the world. They cannot prevent the promotion and development of the revolution in the world, and they cannot prevent the development of socialism in China and other countries."[78]

  For this reason, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that the countries in the middle zone between the two camps can be divided into three situations: one is changing from bad to good, the other is continuing peaceful neutrality, and the other is changing from good to bad. . Nehru wanted to use the Sino-Indian border issue as a card to control the rightists in the country, control the inside of the Congress Party, and attack the leftists. At the same time, he asked for assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union for assistance. The Indian government does not want to solve the problem. [79] "The role played by Nehru is gradually recognized among the Indian people, and it is him who is reactionary." [80] Chen Yi emphasized in a speech at the East China Group of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 14, 1962: Facts show that our struggle against the joint front of Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Nehru cannot be avoided and is very necessary. However, our struggle is measured and restrained, and it cannot be said that the struggle has been overdone. …So there was another unhealthy trend like'Three and One Young', mainly because of the three-year temporary difficulties, which scared some people who were not firm in Marxist-Leninist stance. We must refute this opinion. Our foreign policy is now. Correctly, it helps us gain time and overcome temporary difficulties. If we adopt an opportunistic policy, it will not only affect the foreign struggle, but also the domestic situation." [81]

  Under the guidance of the above theoretical ideas, 1962 On September 29, the Tenth Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China further clarified the guidelines for China’s foreign policy, believing that “class struggles on an international scale are being carried out fiercely.” Therefore, the long-term main task of China’s diplomacy is: "Resolutely and thoroughly oppose the main dangerous revisionism in the international communist movement, resolutely and thoroughly oppose dogmatism, sectarianism, and big-power chauvinism and narrow nationalism." [82] So far, the characteristics of China's "revolutionary diplomacy" have become more obvious and prominent.

  The Soviet Union's position on the Sino-Indian border issue and Sino-

  Soviet relations    The Soviet Union 's position on the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 has exacerbated the contradictions and differences between China and the Soviet Union since the mid to late 1950s. The Soviet Union's policy stance on these issues generally reflects the changes in Soviet foreign policy since Khrushchev came to power and the impact of such changes on Soviet-China relations and Soviet-Indian relations. China’s response to the Soviet policy has highlighted the fundamental differences between China and the Soviet Union on major international issues and judgments on the international situation since the mid to late 1950s.

  After Stalin's death, in line with Khrushchev's foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence", the Soviet Union's policy toward India has undergone major changes. A sentence from Nikolai Bulganin is very representative. He said: "We don't want Nehru to be a communist. We want Nehru to be Nehru." GM Malenkov, 1953 8 At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, he praised India’s peace efforts during the Korean War, and hoped that the relations between the Soviet Union and India would become closer in the future and jointly develop a spirit of friendship and cooperation. Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955 and received an unprecedented welcome. The Soviet Union praised India as a "big country" and "an important force for maintaining peace." At that time, India’s ambassador to the Soviet Union KPS Menon said that the Russians were praising everything in India. [83] Khrushchev pointed out at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1955 that if India joins the socialist camp after China, Western capitalism will decline decisively. Therefore, the Soviet Union does not need to clashed with the West prematurely, but should launch an offensive in underdeveloped regions. [84] On the Goa issue, the Soviet Union supported India's actions and condemned the Portuguese rule of Goa as a "civilized shame." The Soviet Union clearly supports India’s position on the Kashmir issue, which India regards as crucial. In December 1955 Khrushchev publicly stated that "Kashmir is a state of the Republic of India, and this has been decided by the Kashmir people." Bulganin once again stated this position of the Soviet Union in his report to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. [85]

  It is worth mentioning here that an important article by the Soviet ambassador to China, Pavel Yudin, reflects the basic policies of the Soviet leadership towards India and Nehru. Eugene's article entitled "Answer to Nehru's "Basic Method"" was published in the "International Marxist Review" in December 1958. Eugene criticized the internal and external policies of the Indian government, saying that Nehru's method was "vague, subjective and contradictory." In response to Nehru’s reaction to the Hungarian incident, Eugene emphasized that when the Indian bourgeoisie and landlords used violence against the people, first of all against workers and peasants, the violence of the socialist country was against the enemy of society. But Eugene praised Nehru as an "outstanding leader" and praised his important role in fighting for the national liberation of India and for world peace. The article also emphasized that despite ideological differences, socialist countries will be the "sincere, reliable and selfless friends" of the Indian people. [86]

  Under the guidance of this policy, the Soviet-Indian relations during Khrushchev's period developed rapidly, especially in the economic and trade relations between the two countries. Since 1955, the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and India has continued to rise. In 1958, India’s imports from the Soviet Union were 45.6 million U.S. dollars, accounting for 1.8% of its total imports; India’s exports to the Soviet Union in the same year were 49 million U.S. dollars, accounting for 4.2% of its total exports. From 1951 to 1959, India and Trade between the Soviet Union increased 15 times. At the same time, the Soviet Union also provided a large amount of economic assistance to India. In September 1959, the Soviet Union granted India a loan of US$378 million for India's third five-year plan. [87] In 1961, the Soviet Union agreed to sell to India equipment suitable for road construction in the Sino-Indian border area. In April 1961, the Soviet Union sold 8 An-12 transport aircraft to India. This type of aircraft could deliver combat personnel and supplies to areas at an altitude of 17,000 feet. India hoped to use this type of aircraft in the Ladakh region. Prior to this, India also purchased Yiliu-14 transport aircraft and Mi-4 helicopters from the Soviet Union. In July 1962, India also purchased MiG-21 fighter jets. [88]

  In this context, the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 undoubtedly put the Soviet Union in a very complicated situation. First of all, in the opinion of Soviet leaders, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has always regarded the Sino-Indian border issue as a class struggle on an international scale, and therefore tried to gain support from fraternal parties. The Soviet Union did not agree with this view of the CCP and hoped that it could maintain friendly relations with India. Secondly, the Sino-Indian border conflict has greatly exacerbated the situation of the Indian Communist Party and led to the split of the Indian Communist Party. At the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of India in 1961, Mikhail Suslov did his best to prevent the pro-China Communist Party members from gaining a dominant position, and at the same time they did not discuss what the other faction proposed at the conference. Criticize the CCP and support Nehru's resolution. These actions of the Soviet Union were of course known to the CCP and caused strong dissatisfaction from the CCP Central Committee. Third, the Soviet Union believes that China's "belligerent approach" to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue may affect China's handling of other disputed border issues, especially the disputed border between China and the Soviet Union. On September 8, 1959, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a detailed report entitled "Soviet-China Border Issue" to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, indicating that the Soviet decision-making departments were aware of possible border issues with China. Finally, the leaders of the Soviet Union were very upset that China did not inform the Soviet Union on many major issues, and the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 was no exception. After the second Taiwan Strait crisis, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union told the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China through diplomatic channels that it is very important for the countries in the socialist camp to strengthen unity, mutual assistance and cooperation with the Soviet Union as the center, exchange experience, and unify pace. It is the most reliable way to build socialism. Guarantee. Therefore, the leaders of the CPSU expressed the hope that China would have a better understanding of the desirability of the socialist countries for mutual assistance, cooperation and unity. The socialist countries also hope that China will play more roles in this regard and become the socialist camp for unity and development. A powerful factor of [89] The significance of the above considerations and corresponding decisions of the Soviet Union is very clear.

  Therefore, the Soviet Union's position on the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 was clearly reflected in the statement of the TASS News Agency on September 9, 1959. Regarding this statement, Nehru stated on September 11: “Considering all aspects, this statement is fair and unusual for the Soviet government.” After another border conflict in Ladakh on October 23 , Pravda also issued a policy statement on conflicts between China and India. On October 30, Khrushchev expressed regret and distress over the Sino-Indian border conflict at the Supreme Soviet Conference, and hoped that the border issue would be resolved peacefully. On December 22, the Soviet newspaper broke the convention and first published India's note to China for the first time, without waiting for a corresponding response from the Chinese side. [90]

  Regarding the TASS statement and the position of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China wrote to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on September 13, 1959, criticizing the Soviet government for "adopting an accommodating and compromising stance on important issues of principle." The world has shown that China and the Soviet Union are divided on the issue of the Sino-Indian border conflict, which makes the Indian bourgeoisie and the British and American imperialists feel happy, because they are trying to get a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. [91] In another letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized that the internal and external policies of the Nehru government have gone farther and farther on the road of counter-revolution. "We believe that if there is no principle against Nehru and the Indian government, Not only does this fail to make their position better, but on the contrary, if China does not resist their increasingly offensive positions and condemns them, it can only encourage their atrocities. That is not only for Sino-Indian friendship. The disadvantage is that it is also not conducive to improving Nehru and the Indian government. It can only further push them to the West." The letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also criticized the Soviet Union's policy on the Sino-Indian border conflict. In the view of the Soviet Union, the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China not only reflects that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is unwilling to correctly evaluate its mistakes in its policy towards India, but also that it is unwilling to correctly evaluate the measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to handle the Sino-Indian conflict. [92]

  The Sino-Indian boundary issue became a major issue of intense disputes with the leaders of the CPC Central Committee during Khrushchev’s visit to China in October 1959. During the talks, Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized: "The territorial issue is not difficult to transcend. You have had a good relationship with India for many years. Sudden bloodshed occurred, so Nehru is in a very difficult situation... if Nehru If he stepped down, who would be better than him?...Although he opposes us, this does not prevent us from maintaining a good relationship with him." Khrushchev clearly stated to the leaders of the CPC Central Committee: "You really want us Do you support your conflict with India? As far as we are concerned, it is stupid. The TASS statement is necessary. You should be able to see some of the differences between us and Nehru. If we do not issue a TASS statement, it will be caused. The socialist countries united to deal with Nehru’s impression. The TASS statement made this issue only between you and India." Regarding the Tibet issue, Khrushchev said: "The Tibet incident is the fault of the Chinese Communist Party, not Nepal. Khru’s fault.” In the

  face of Khrushchev’s criticism, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China not only expressed their desire to denounce the “counter-revolutionary side of the national bourgeoisie”, but also “bring Nehru to our side through our struggle.” . According to Khrushchev’s memoirs, Chen Yi criticized the Soviet Union’s statement during the meeting and emphasized: “Don’t you know that Nehru is just an agent of U.S. imperialism? You don’t know if India’s progressive forces are to win. Must Helu be ruled out?" The central leadership of the Communist Party of China emphasized on the border conflict: "We also only recently learned about the border incident. All actions and measures are taken by local agencies without central instructions."[93] Khrushchev believes that Mao Zedong "provoked the Sino-Indian conflict to drag the Soviet Union in. He wanted to put us in a situation where he had no choice but to support him. He wanted to be the one who decides what we should do." For the Soviet policy, Khrushchev insisted, "Our position expressed by the TASS statement is correct. If we do not act like that or make a public statement, we can only offer India to the US imperialists."[94 ]

  The position of the Soviet Union and the analysis and criticism of the policies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were prominently demonstrated after Khrushchev’s visit to China. Suslov submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union on December 18, 1959. Report of a government delegation’s visit to the People’s Republic of China. This report comprehensively and sharply criticized China's domestic and foreign policies, and in particular showed the fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian border issue. [95] Regarding the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, although the report believes that Indian reactionary groups may intervene in the rebellion to a certain extent, it also emphasizes that “if we combine Tibet’s historical characteristics to implement democratic reforms in time and take appropriate measures to promote Tibet’s economy The development of culture and culture, while maintaining proper vigilance against the reactionary forces, it is possible that the rebellion in Tibet will not occur. Unfortunately, the reactionary forces of the Central Committee of the CPSU are engaged in separating Tibet from the territory of the People’s Republic of China by force. The Chinese comrades turned a deaf ear to the warnings about the activities of the People’s Republic of China.” The report pointed out that the purpose of the imperialist tactics on the Tibet issue is to make it “a cause of disputes between China and India, causing the two major powers in Asia to fight each other and worsen it. The situation in South Asia undermines the influence of the socialist camp in that region, including China, and weakens the status of communism in the national liberation movement." The report accuses China of failing to consider the above-mentioned imperialist tactics, and violently criticizes India and Nehru, and believes that this policy of China will further deteriorate relations with India. Regarding the Sino-Indian border issue, the report opposes China’s solution to the problem, and emphasizes that such a method “results in the decline of the People’s Republic of China’s international prestige in Asia, weakens its position in Asia, and increases the number of Asian countries with Western powers and co-operations. The tendency of the United States to form an alliance, even though the people of Asian countries have a strong hatred of their long-term enemy colonizers.” Soviet leaders also undoubtedly regarded the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 as China’s visit to the United States and Camp David in Khrushchev. An important evidence of "deliberately sabotaging the easing of tension" before the talks. [96] In

  this way, since the end of 1959, the Sino-Indian border issue has become a key issue in the fierce dispute between China and the Soviet Union, which not only contains conflicts of national interests, but also embodies the fundamental differences of ideology.

  First, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China criticized the Soviet Union's "neutrality" policy and opposed the Soviet Union's practice of making the differences between China and the Soviet Union public. On December 10, 1959, when Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi met with the Soviet ambassador to China Chervonenko (S. Chervonenko), they pointed out that unprincipled concessions to Nehru would only make him turn more to the right. Zhou Enlai emphasized that the Chinese and Soviet parties have different views on certain issues. They can argue and exchange opinions internally. However, they should not openly disagree and let the bourgeois public opinion catch it and make a loud noise and make use of it. This does not help. The situation eased, and Chervonenko was asked to convey the opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Chervonenko believed that Khrushchev’s speech could not draw the impression of supporting India, and agreed to convey China’s views. [97] On January 19, 1960, Zhou Enlai met with Chervonenko and asked him to convey China’s position on the Sino-Indian border issue to the Central Committee of the CPSU and Khrushchev. Zhou Enlai emphasized: "The incident was provoked by India. Yes, the reason is on our side. The Indian side wants to force China and the Soviet Union to publicly express certain differences on the Sino-Indian border issue. If the Soviet leader said that he wanted to intervene during his visit to India, it would be used by the Indian bourgeoisie, and we had to Expressing a different attitude, this will put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage and be detrimental to the unity of the two parties." Two days later, Chervonenko met with Chen Yi and said that he had reported the situation of the talks with Zhou Enlai on January 19 to the Central Committee of the CPSU. . Chervonenko emphasized that the Central Committee of the CPSU will strictly observe neutrality on the Sino-Indian border issue and oppose the intervention of third countries. They have always adhered to this position and will adhere to this position in the future. Chervonenko said that they were a little surprised by China's concerns and commissioned Chen Yi to convey the Soviet Union's above-mentioned position to Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. [98]

  Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi expressed surprise when they received Chervonenko on January 26, 1960. Zhou Enlai affirmed that in the socialist camp, a fraternal country was bullied by a country led by the bourgeoisie in the border incident, while another fraternal country expressed neutrality. This is a new phenomenon in international communist relations. This is the essence The above is to defend India and support the views of the nationalist state. Zhou Enlai emphasized: “The Soviet Union should not publicly express the differences between our two parties on the Sino-Indian border issue. In order to distinguish between right and wrong, we have to make a comprehensive analysis of the response of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union.” Zhou Enlai also pointed out that Xiang Ni should not be used. Heru made concessions to prevent Nehru from turning right. On January 27, at the request of the Soviet ambassador, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi held talks with Chervonenko. Chervonenko explained that the term "neutral" was a mistake in his verbal communication. Zhou Enlai made it clear that the abolition of the term "neutrality" will not change the essence of yesterday's talk. China and the Soviet Union are divided on the issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute. On January 30, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi once again pointed out in their talks with Chervonenko that it was incorrect for the Central Committee of the CPSU to favor India on the Sino-Indian boundary issue. [99]

  Second, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China undoubtedly believes that the crux of the Sino-Indian border issue lies in India's reactionary policy. On February 5, 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued an oral notice to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China through Kang Sheng, the Chinese representative who was participating in the Political Consultative Conference of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow, further publicly criticizing the CCP’s performance on the Sino-Indian border issue as a "narrow nationality". The sentiments of ism and adventurism”, because in the view of the Soviet Union, in fact, “there is no actual military threat from India to People’s China in the past and present.” [100] Regarding this position of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized that the resolution of the border conflict should affect India, not China, because "Nehru is the core figure in the anti-China camp in India. The border issue."[101] In the second meeting with the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on September 18, 1960, Deng Xiaoping, the head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China, criticized the Soviet Union for failing to take action during the border conflict between China and India, and for failing to undertake its due diligence. Responsibility. Regarding Suslov’s view that China was not threatened by the aggressor, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that China could not agree to it. He also pointed out: You said that you should adopt a neutral attitude in the Sino-Indian border conflict. This is news to us. Able to take a neutral stand when the fraternal socialist country conflicts with the capitalist India. [102]

  While expressing the above-mentioned position, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also expressed great dissatisfaction with the Soviet military support for India. When Zhou Enlai received Chervonenko on October 8, 1962, he said: India may launch a large-scale war on the eastern section of the Sino-Indian border.

  "Over the years, we have been patient and restrained. They invaded our territory, killed and wounded our people. Apart from self-defense, we never attacked, did not attack, and never fired first. They think the Chinese can bully, and now Two brigades are also prepared to attack. If they launch an attack, we will resolutely defend ourselves.” Zhou Enlai emphasized in particular: The Soviet-made rice helicopters and Soviet-made transport planes used by India are in the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Indian border. Transporting military supplies has an impact on the soldiers in front of us. [103] At the same time, China criticized the Soviet Union's position on the Sino-Indian border issue in response to the Soviet Union's policy on nuclear non-proliferation. On October 20, the Chinese government sent a memorandum to the Soviet government on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and distributed the memorandum to other socialist countries. China emphasized in the memorandum that: "No matter how powerful the Soviet military might be, it cannot solve the defense problems of all socialist countries. For example, in China's defense of its border with India, the Soviet Union played the opposite role." [104] Regarding India’s rejection of the proposal to hold talks between the two countries in Beijing on October 15, China made it clear to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels that the current tensions on the Sino-Indian border were entirely caused by provocations by the Indian side. The Mahon Line attacked the border post in China. The fundamental reason why India insists on fighting China to the end is to use it to ask for money from the United States externally and to gain support from domestic reactionary political forces internally. China emphasizes that India's perverse actions on the border issue will eventually damage the relations between the two countries to the point of irreparable damage. [105] These diplomatic actions clearly indicated to the Soviet Union that China not only resolutely opposes the Soviet Union’s policy stance on the Sino-Indian border issue, but will also take corresponding decisive actions on the border issue. Therefore, before the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviet Union fully understood China's policy stance, and also fully understood the consequences of its policies in the upcoming border conflict.

  During the same period, under the influence of the Soviet policy, other socialist countries and the Communist Parties of all countries also supported the Soviet Union's policy on the Sino-Indian border issue. At the National Communist and Workers’ Party Congress held in Moscow in November 1960, representatives of many countries criticized China’s policy on the Sino-Indian border issue. In his speech on November 21, 1960, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, the general secretary of the Communist Party of India, also accused China of underestimating the meaning of a neutral country. He claimed that China’s position on the Sino-Indian border issue was wrong, and the CCP’s relationship with the CCP. It is also an expression of arrogance and arrogance. In this regard, Gao Shi put forward: how the government of a socialist country treats a neutral and peaceful country like India; and how the Chinese Party treats a fraternal party related to this. Coats and most of the delegates at the meeting expressed support for the Soviet Union's position on the Sino-Indian border issue, and believed that the Soviet Union's policy on this issue and the TASS statement were "correct, wise and timely." [106] The reaction of the Communist Party of these countries has made the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China more convinced that it must resolutely counteract the "revisionist" thinking and behavior embodied in the Sino-Indian border issue.

  Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, the Sino-Soviet policy stance on the Sino-Indian border clearly indicated that the contradictions and differences between China and the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian border issue were far from dealing with border and territorial policy issues, but The strategic issues of how the Chinese and Soviet parties deal with "peaceful coexistence" and what policies they adopt toward a nationalist country like India are obviously difficult to reconcile the policy positions of the two parties.

  The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962: process and major power diplomacy

  Before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in 1962, both China and India were making diplomatic and military deployments in order to strive for a favorable strategic situation. After ending his visit to India in April 1960, Zhou Enlai called the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong in Kunming on May 5th: In view of the fact that the Indian army stopped patrolling while the Sino-Indian Joint Communiqué did not mention it, it had begun to move around in the western section. To this end, Zhou Enlai suggested, order "Tibet and the Southern Xinjiang Military Region to seize the current opportunity and weather conditions, control favorable terrain within a few kilometers, for example, on the border of our country, and set up additional posts first, but after the additional posts are added, the troops are ordered to stop patrolling. I should persuade the Indian army to withdraw and avoid armed conflict.” Mao Zedong replied to agree with this proposal. [107]

  Under the guidance of the aforementioned policies, China has strengthened its military deployment in the Sino-Indian border areas. Zhou Enlai issued instructions on May 22, 1962: "For possible armed provocations on the Sino-Indian border, we must fully prepare, and we must prepare by the end of June. If the Indian side dared to open fire by then, we will not fight. One fight will be a complete victory, and the land that the copy army has invaded must be collected." Zhou Enlai emphasized, "The Sino-Indian border will not fight singles. If there is, it will be the enemy's restraint. We should not be restrained by the enemy. Our main attention is The force should still be at sea, and Southeast Asia is a long-term battle between the enemy and us." [108] In July 1962, Zhou Enlai heard several times about the tension on the Sino-Indian border due to the continued implementation of the "forward policy" by the Indian army. The situation was reported and reported to Mao Zedong twice at the end of July.

  In mid-July 1962, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to discuss the border situation between China and India and formulate important guidelines and policies. [109] After Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai reported on the situation on the western section of the Sino-Indian border at the meeting, they proposed two plans: one is to pull out the new strongholds of the Indian army and use force to expel the Indian army that was counter-surrounded by the Chinese border defense forces. ; The second is not to use force and find a way to force the Indian army to retreat. After listening to the report, Mao Zedong pointed out that for India to set up a site in our territory, we have every reason to fight. But now we have to exercise restraint and not rush to fight. Why? First, we must further expose Nehru's true face. Now Nehru is overwhelmed, thinking that his mangy tactics are very useful. Second, strive for a correct international understanding of the right and wrong issues of the Sino-Indian border struggle, and strive for the sympathy and support of the majority of us, especially the centrists. Some countries in the world do not have a clear view of the Sino-Indian border issue, and cannot figure out who is right and who is wrong. At the same time, our struggle with India is a very complicated international struggle. It is not only an issue of India, but US imperialism and the Soviet Union are all involved. They support India. They want to take advantage of our temporary difficulties to push us into battle and rectify us, but we are not caught in their trap. We insist on not taking the first shot. At this meeting, Mao Zedong determined the guidelines and policies on the Sino-Indian border issue, that is, "Never give in, avoid bloodshed, coexist with arms, and cross the teeth." On August 18, Mao Zedong instructed on the work report of the Central Military Commission that in the western section of the Sino-Indian border, he would fight tit-for-tat against India’s encroachment policy. [110] On October 5th, Zhou Enlai clearly stated in the intelligence that India had determined to launch an offensive against China that the General Counselor learned: "If the Indian army starts in the eastern section, in addition to giving heavy blows, the western section can also annihilate it at the same time. Several strongholds." Zhou Enlai also ordered Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing to speed up military deployment. [111] Marshal Liu Bocheng, then head of the strategy team of the Central Military Commission, put forward detailed opinions on the combat plan many times. From October 10th to 17th, 1962, Liu Bocheng asked the combat troops to step up their pre-war training and be really familiar with the terrain and roads. "We must use night and dawn attacks and surprise tactics, and concentrate our advantages to destroy the enemy’s vital points (such as the command center or the main group). Etc.)", "All articles should be written in the words "quick battle and quick decision", and must not be scattered." On October 18-19, Liu Bocheng put forward important opinions on the combat of Xinjiang combat troops, "How can we achieve thoroughness, cleanliness, and completeness." To annihilate the enemy, according to Chairman Mao’s thinking, if you want to find a way to disperse the enemy, I am very worried about gnawing the bones... Tactics are not dead things. Native methods are good tactics to win battles."[112]

  In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Tibet Military Region established the command organization for combat against India-Military Region Forward Command Post (codenamed Unit 419), appointed Chai Hongquan as commander and Yin Fatang as political commissar, and unified command of the three main forces of the original 18th Army. Regiment: 154 Regiment, 155 Regiment and 157 Regiment. Later, 55 divisions and 11 divisions were added. Under the leadership of Zhang Guohua, the forward command post of the military region studied in detail the first-stage combat plan, which was approved by the Central Military Commission. [113]

  At the same time, China continued to carry out diplomatic activities against India, striving for the support of favorable international public opinion on the basis of adhering to its position on the border issue. At the end of October 1961, when Zhou Enlai met with Indian Chargé d'affaires to China, Banerjee, he pointed out that Nehru had made a unique contribution to helping people under colonial rule gain independence. There is an urgent need for China and India to work together. Zhou Enlai emphasized that some major powers are trying to influence Mr. Nehru for their own national purposes and are trying to widen the differences between China and India. In a telegram to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the meeting, Banerjee believed that Zhou Enlai had studied Nehru very carefully. He tried to regain Nehru’s trust and minimize the possibility of further tension between the two countries. Issues such as border conflicts and access to disputed areas have been avoided. [114] When meeting with Banerjee on August 4, 1962, Zhou Enlai stated that China agreed to negotiate with India. When Banerjee asked what would happen if the negotiations could not solve the problem, Zhou Enlai made it clear that India must withdraw from Chinese territory and stop infringing upon Chinese territory. Zhou Enlai criticized India not only for inheriting the legacy of British imperialism, but also adopting the same strategy and attitude. Zhou Enlai emphasized that now, unfortunately, Nehru has lost control of his government, and the Indian people do not believe in their government either. Zhou Enlai also severely criticized India for sheltering Tibetan rebels. Banerjee quickly reported the situation of the talks with Zhou Enlai to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but did not receive any reply. [115]

  In late August, after Banerjee returned to China from his visit to North Korea, he received a top-secret telegram from India’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs Desai (MJ Desai), instructing Banerjee to call on Zhou Enlai immediately and inform the Indian government that he was ready to send a ministerial level. Of the delegation to Beijing to discuss all bilateral issues and disputes without any preconditions. Unable to meet Zhou Enlai, Banerjee was received by Chen Yi the next day. Chen Yi stated that if the Indian government does not unambiguously and publicly cancel all its fictitious and false claims on Chinese territory, this suggestion is unacceptable. Chen Yi emphasized that the current proposal is full of Indian propaganda and gunpowder to attack China. It is a trap and therefore unacceptable. Banerjee then sent a telegram to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the talks between him and Chen Yi, but again he did not receive any reply. On August 22, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a note to the Chinese Embassy in India, again recommending that the two governments hold talks to determine steps to restore the original state of the Ladakh region's borders that have been changed by force in the past five years . China rejected this proposal from India. [116] The

  Soviet Union tried to influence China and India before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out. On May 14, 1962, after India issued a note to China, Cherwonianko called on Banerjee and asked whether Banerjee had contacted the Chinese side regarding the Indian government's note. If so, how did the Chinese side react. After hearing Banerjee's introduction, Chervonenko was very disappointed. He told Banerjee that according to the information he received from Moscow, Krishna Menon, Gromyko and Chen Yi had discussed the Indian side's note in Geneva, and agreed that he hoped that this note would not only serve the Chinese side. Accepted, but also can create a better atmosphere for further negotiations. Banerjee expressed doubts about Chen Yi’s agreement with the Indian note. At the same time, he also doubted the possibility of using the Aksai Chin road for civilian purposes as suggested in the note, because the Indian side believed that this road was in fact completely military in China. Continue to be used for military purposes under control. Chervonenko agreed with this, but he pointed out that the Soviet Union and India should continue their efforts to peacefully resolve "misunderstandings" with the Chinese. [117] Banerjee complained about the inefficiency of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs because the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not inform him of such important information.

  In this case, the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict is already a matter of time.

  At 7:30 on October 20, 1962, the artillery group of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the artillery belonging to each regiment carried out a 15-minute fire attack on the Indian army in the Kjelang area, destroying the Indian army’s artillery positions and some fortifications. At 7:45, the ground forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched an assault and quickly broke into the Indian position. Eleven hours later, the Battle of Kjelang ended. At 8:30 on November 18th, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army launched a general offensive against the Indian army as planned, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission and Liu Bocheng that “the more viable the enemy is, the better.” It launched a 30-day Xishan Pass in the eastern section. -Battle of Bundila. The Chinese People's Liberation Army killed 671 people and injured 811 in the Sino-Indian border conflict. [118] Regarding the casualties in India, according to Indian data, 1383 people were killed, 1696 missing, 3968 arrested, and 90% of the casualties were in the eastern section. [119]

  Faced with the situation on the border, Nehru was forced to admit: “We are getting farther and farther away from the reality of the modern world, but living in an illusory atmosphere created by ourselves.” [120] In this case, Nehru Called on the Soviet Union to intervene in the conflict and began to openly request military assistance from Western countries. Nehru’s first diplomatic action during the crisis was to inform the Soviet ambassador to India: India will never ask the West for weapons assistance beyond the “limits for repelling Chinese aggression”. [121] But the actual situation is quite the opposite. On October 26, Nehru sent a letter to Kennedy. After introducing the situation of the Sino-Indian border conflict, he declared: "At this critical juncture, I am confident that I will have your sympathy and support." When thinking about discussing the issue of US military assistance, Nehru said that in order to save India’s face, he hoped that the United States would not reward India for joining the military alliance. [122] However, the development of the border situation caused Nehru to quickly abandon the above position. As India rejected China’s ceasefire proposal, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army took another military action on November 18. India's military defeat has created even greater panic in India. At that time, "rumors spread, even saying that the Chinese army would send paratroopers to land in New Delhi." [123] Without discussing with the cabinet, Nehru sent two urgent letters to Kennedy on November 20, calling on the United States to form an alliance with India to intervene in the Sino-Indian border conflict. Nehru said in the letter that the situation in India has reached the brink of despair, and China's large-scale offensive shows that its purpose is not just to obtain those disputed lands. He suggested that India and the United States form a military alliance and hoped that the United States would directly participate in the battle. He asked Kennedy to immediately send at least 12 air squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and radar communication equipment to India, and send American personnel to operate these aircraft and equipment to protect India. Cities were protected from Chinese airstrikes until Indian personnel were able to control them independently. If possible, the United States should send additional aircraft, personally piloted by American personnel, to help the Indian Air Force attack the Chinese army. In the letter, Nehru also requested Kennedy to send two B-47 bomber squadrons to India to attack Chinese bases and airports. Indian pilots and technicians will immediately go to the United States for training in order to master relevant technologies as soon as possible. Considering that the United States is worried about Pakistan's response to the above-mentioned actions, Nehru assured that all the aid and equipment will only be used against the Chinese. [124]

  On the other hand, after the Sino-Indian border conflict began, the United States immediately reacted to support India and took a tough stand. On the second day after receiving Nehru’s letter, Kennedy replied: "In addition to sympathy, I will try my best to give you practical support that is most beneficial to you." Kennedy also issued a public threat to China: "If If China continues to move forward, that will force the President of the United States to take appropriate action.” By November 3, the United States had delivered the first batch of emergency military assistance to India and provided intelligence on China’s military operations. In order to enable the Indian army in the western border to be transferred to the east, the United States also persuaded Pakistan to reduce its pressure on India. [125] At the same time, 12 C-130 large transport aircraft rushed to India to help transport Indian soldiers on the front lines of Kashmir to the east. To further demonstrate his support for India, Kennedy instructed Ambassador Galbraith to issue a statement in support of India's demand for disputed territories and recognize the "McMahon Line" as a conventional international boundary line. On November 14, BK Menon, the Indian ambassador to the United States, and Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Affairs, signed an agreement on US military assistance to India in Washington. Talbot stated that the purpose of US aid is to help India oppose the "outright aggression by the Chinese." As long as India does not use these weapons against Pakistan, all of India's requirements can be met.

  Britain’s attitude towards the Sino-Indian border conflict is also tough and clear. On October 22, 1962, the British government issued a statement stating that the British government “has always recognized that the McMahon Line is the border of India, and of course continues to do so”. “It deeply regrets China’s attack on a member of the Federation. The people express their utmost sympathy and admire their patience and restraint in the face of constant provocations.” Prime Minister Harold MacMillan said publicly: “We will do whatever they want us to help them.” October 29 , Two ships equipped with small arms reached India. This was the first batch of munitions aided by Western countries to India since the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The British government also sent a high-level political-military delegation to New Delhi at the end of November to examine India's military needs. [126]

  After receiving diplomatic support and military assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States, Nehru tried to maximize the support of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union also tried to exert its influence. Soviet-Indian relations developed rapidly during the border conflict and decisively influenced China. Decision-making. A few hours after the border conflict broke out, Khrushchev wrote to Nehru through the Soviet embassy in India, regretting the conflict between the two "friendly countries" and calling on the two countries to negotiate after a ceasefire. After China proposed a ceasefire, the Soviet Union hoped that India would accept China's proposal for negotiations. Pravda’s October 25 editorial also expressed the same view. Nehru was very dissatisfied with Soviet policy at the beginning, especially the editorial of Pravda. Nehru rejected Khrushchev’s proposal that India accept a ceasefire and negotiate with China; he emphasized that before considering negotiations with China, the Chinese army must withdraw to its position before September 20. [127] Nehru wrote to Khrushchev after the publication of the October 25 editorial in Pravda, emphasizing that if China retreats to the position before September, he will negotiate with China. Nehru also said that the editorial of Pravda deeply hurt him and at the same time seriously damaged the friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union; because in the eyes of Indians, the Soviet Union’s publication of "this bad article" can only Use "the situation of the Cuban crisis and the threat of war" to explain. [128]

  India repeatedly stated its policy stance to the Soviet Union during the border conflict and tried to make the Soviet Union support India. On November 2, 1962, Raku Nehru had a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov and claimed that Indian diplomatic policymakers did their best to resolve border disputes and maintained friendly relations with China: "We will not To stop the hope of peaceful settlement of disputes, we will not make any military preparations, because it is impossible to resolve border disputes by military means. Therefore, the result is our current retreat." La Ku Nehru believes that in China’s leaders In China, Zhou Enlai did not agree with the current policy towards India, while Liu Shaoqi did the opposite. It is worth noting that during the talks, La Ku Nehru emphasized that this is not just a border conflict. It is obviously the “extreme leftist dogmatist sect (the leftist sect) that holds the supreme leadership of the CCP. a component of the basic strategy of dogmatists-sectarians. "This faction is trying to confirm its own view that India, as a bourgeois country, will definitely join the Western bloc and cannot implement a policy of non-alignment for a long time. They do not regard Nehru as a nationalist leader, but Regarded as reactionary bourgeois elements. Through their actions, they forced India to abandon the policy of non-alignment and invest in the Western camp to attack the entire policy of neutrality, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. As the largest neutral country in Asia, India has become the largest neutral country in Asia. Their first and primary goal. Therefore, the problem is not this or that border and this or that territory. The essence of the problem is that the sectarians within the Communist Party of China are trying to prove their theories in practice. The front line of ideology is in an offensive position. La Ku Nehru told the Soviet ambassador that he himself firmly believes that the behavior of the Chinese is "an extension of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the ideological field, and the Chinese sectarian The main goal is to combat the principles of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. These principles include peaceful coexistence, the possibility of avoiding war in the atomic age, and the possibility of victory for communism not through war but through peaceful economic competition with the West. We highly value these principles of Soviet policy. I personally have never opposed the realization of communism in the world, if communism is superior to capitalism in terms of economic, social and cultural achievements, rather than superior in terms of the atomic bomb. "La Ku Nehru claimed that China tried to use all means, including military means, to achieve its goals. "Unlike the Soviet Union and the United States, they don't understand the danger of nuclear war." Now the world is no longer divided into the East and West camps, but into the following two camps: the camp that is in favor of the continuity of mankind and the side that opposes the continuation of mankind, that is, the Chinese sectarians. "La Ku Nehru said that India is currently at the forefront of the struggle against Chinese fanatics to realize their theoretical plans in practice, and such theoretical plans of the Chinese are a threat to the world and all mankind. Therefore, everyone must support our struggle. We will never retreat in front of them, will not yield to their threats, will not agree to their terms based on force and seize our territory. Instead, we must repel them and smash their first practical attempt to prove their theory. Only their failure and India's policy of maintaining its non-alignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical beliefs. "[129] Pieists. "La Ku Nehru said that India is currently at the forefront of the struggle against Chinese fanatics to realize their theoretical plans in practice, and such theoretical plans of the Chinese are a threat to the world and all mankind. Therefore, everyone must support our struggle. We will never retreat in front of them, will not yield to their threats, will not agree to their terms based on force and seize our territory. Instead, we must repel them and smash their first practical attempt to prove their theory. Only their failure and India's policy of maintaining its non-alignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical beliefs. "[129] Pieists. "La Ku Nehru said that India is currently at the forefront of the struggle against Chinese fanatics to realize their theoretical plans in practice, and such theoretical plans of the Chinese are a threat to the world and all mankind. Therefore, everyone must support our struggle. We will never retreat in front of them, will not yield to their threats, will not agree to their terms based on force and seize our territory. Instead, we must repel them and smash their first practical attempt to prove their theory. Only their failure and India's policy of maintaining its non-alignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical beliefs. "[129]

  India also directly sought Khrushchev's support. On November 9, 1962, India’s new ambassador to the Soviet Union TN Kaul called on Khrushchev. Khrushchev seemed impatient with Kaur’s explanation of the conflict between China and India in Ladakh. He pushed Kaul’s map aside and said: "You should give the map to Malinovs. Look at Marshal Ki. My expert told me that you and the Chinese are fighting for those highlands, and in those highlands, if a person defecates there, his anus will freeze." Kaul replied, "For us, Every inch of our land is sacred, just as every inch of your land is also sacred to you." Kaul condemned China's use of force and asked Khrushchev: "When peace is due to your friendly neighbor, India How can a peace-loving country like you remain silent when it is threatened by armed attack or aggression?" Khrushchev replied, "You are our friends, and the Chinese are our brothers. We can't. Favor either side. But we have stated in the TASS statement in 1959 that the problem should be resolved peacefully and not by force.” When Kaul said, “If my brother beats my friend, I won’t "Never mind", Khrushchev said: "But you have to know that the Chinese are not such little brothers." But it is particularly worth noting that Khrushchev asked Kaur to talk to Malino during the talks. Marshal Marshal discussed the details of military assistance to India. [130] Kaur telegraphed Nehru after the meeting to report on the talks with Khrushchev. Kaur said that although Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government would not provide weapons and equipment to any party, he emphasized that the Soviet Union would fulfill its contract with India to sell transport aircraft and its parts and provide training to India. Kaur said that Khrushchev also made it clear that India will not have such a great or sincere friend as the Soviet Union. [131]

  During the second meeting with Khrushchev on November 24, Kaur discovered that Khrushchev's attitude had undergone a fundamental change. During the talks, Khrushchev stated that he could not make a commitment to provide military assistance to India in the last meeting, because the Cuban missile crisis was at its height and the Soviet Union had to make "combat preparations." Khrushchev pledged to provide India with all possible military equipment. [132] When Kaul discussed military assistance issues with Malinowski, Malinowski advised India not to buy second-hand British aircraft carriers, because "it looks like a five-legged dog and is easy to become an attacker. "Goal", but should be equipped with tanks and the latest navy and air force weapons, while also establishing India's own defense industry. When Kaur asked whether the Soviet Union was going to provide the aforementioned assistance to India, Malinowski replied: "Of course you can, but you must get the consent of the boss." [133] On December 12, Benediktov accepted Khrushchev's instructions, talks with Nehru, and in the talks made clear the position of the Soviet Union. Benediktov first stated that the Soviet government admired the efforts of the Indian government and Nehru to commit to the non-alignment policy and the efforts to maintain and develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Benediktov said that the Sino-Indian border conflict should be resolved through negotiations and peaceful means. Nehru took a tough attitude during the talks. He said that the conflict was not provoked by India, but China imposed on India. India does not want to take military action, but hopes that the problem will be resolved. Nehru emphasized: "Of course we did not invade Chinese territory, but what must be considered is that the Indian people demand the liberation of those territories belonging to India." Regarding the issue of negotiations with China, Nehru insisted that it must be restored to three months ago. The state of the border, that is, the border on September 8, can be negotiated. [134]

  After the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out, the Chinese side, out of diplomatic considerations, appealed to India for a peaceful settlement of the border conflict. On October 24, 1962, Zhou Enlai met with Banerjee, the Charg d'affaires of the Indian Embassy in China, and emphasized that the border conflict must end, and submitted to Banerjee the three suggestions of the Chinese government on handling the border conflict. When he visited India in 1960, he agreed to maintain the status quo in the eastern section, but Zhou Enlai categorically denied it. As for the western section, Zhou En said that India has made incredible demands on the Aksai Chin region. Zhou Enlai emphasized that China spent five years building roads there. If it is not on Chinese territory and under Chinese control, how can this be done? If it is Indian territory, what has India been doing in the past seven years? [135] At the same time, Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru twice on October 24 and November 9 to express China's intentions. After the second phase of the border conflict began, Zhou Enlai met with Banerjee on November 19. Zhou Enlai talked about the friendship between China and India, especially Nehru’s status and influence in the Non-Aligned Movement, and pointed out that Nehru may have been misled by the wrong suggestions, otherwise how could he allow himself to be with the empire? Allied powers and accept large amounts of military aid from US imperialism? Zhou Enlai pointed out that Nehru should be aware of these situations and he still has time to stop the war and negotiate. Banerjee said: In order to defend India's independence and repel aggression, the Indian people and government will accept assistance from any country and anyone, even if it is from the devil. [136]

  On the night of November 20th, Zhou Enlai met with Banerjee and announced to him China's unilateral ceasefire decision. [137] The next day, the Chinese government issued a statement announcing that starting at 0:00 on November 22, China will ceasefire across the border between China and India, and from December 1, the Chinese army will be from China and India on November 7, 1959. The actual line of control between the two parties retreated 20 kilometers. The Sino-Indian border conflict ended in a way that "surprised the whole world"[138].

  The factors affecting the process of the Sino-Indian border conflict, in addition to the tough reactions of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries, Sino-Soviet relations, the Cuban missile crisis, the attitudes of Asian and African countries, and the split of the Indian Communist Party, have played an important role that cannot be ignored.

  Before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in 1962, the Soviet Union expressed support for China on this issue. On October 14, 1962, Khrushchev publicly stated at the farewell banquet for Ambassador Liu Xiao’s departure: On the issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Soviet Union is on China’s side. This is the unanimous position of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. If there is unfortunately a war against China, we will stand with China." Khrushchev emphasized: "We did not make a public statement on the Sino-Indian border issue only out of strategic considerations. We cannot push Nehru to the side of the United States... At present Nehru is further surrendering the domestic reactionary forces... Certain diplomatic measures will be taken based on the position stated in Comrade Zhou Enlai’s conversation with the Chinese ambassador and the relevant notes from the Chinese government to India.” Liu Xiao told Khrushchev: The Indian army is assembled on the eastern section of the Sino-Indian border. The war is imposed on China, and China will fight back. Khrushchev stated that this is the same as the information obtained by the Soviet Union, and said that if the Soviet Union is in China's position, the same measures will be taken. Khrushchev also introduced the situation of the Cuban missile crisis and hoped that China would also take measures to safeguard Cuban security. The next day, Mikoyan met with Liu Xiao again and informed the situation about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and asked Liu Xiao to tell the Chinese government. [139]

  On October 22, in a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu, Chervonenko emphasized that it is necessary to understand who is right and who is wrong in border conflicts. If there is no distinction between who is guilty and who is innocent, that is Incorrect; at the same time, it is also incorrect to confuse the difference between guilty and innocent. [140] The Soviet Union undoubtedly hopes that China and the Soviet Union will cooperate and support each other on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban missile crisis.

  Judging from the newly declassified Soviet diplomatic archives, Khrushchev’s decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was motivated by the reaffirmation of the Soviet Union’s obligation to defend the Cuban revolution, the hope to prevent the U.S. invasion of Cuba, and to make up for the strategic nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States In addition to considerations such as the gap between the two countries, “drawing Washington’s attention to the strength of the Soviet Union” is also an important consideration. It is the Soviet leader’s necessary response to the deadlock in the US-Soviet negotiations on the Berlin issue and to the United States’ resumption of nuclear testing. [141] At that time, the Soviet Union hoped that China would give strong support during the Cuban Missile Crisis and work with China through relevant diplomatic channels. Diplomats from East Germany, Hungary and other countries have repeatedly emphasized to Chinese officials that necessary compromise and cooperation must be made between the fraternal socialist parties, especially when there is serious hostility and potential war with the imperialists. [142] However, China’s attitude and response to the Cuban Missile Crisis had an important impact on the Soviet Union’s policy on the Sino-Indian border conflict, making the contradictions and differences between China and the Soviet Union more open and deepened. The relationship between the two parties has actually been Rupture, not in these important events, "the Sino-Soviet alliance is still playing a role, and the two countries support each other in solidarity." [143]

  Under the above policy guidance of the Soviet Union, Pravda published an editorial on the Sino-Indian border conflict on October 25, 1962, condemning the McMahon line that led to the Sino-Indian border conflict was notorious and invalid. It was the United Kingdom. The product of imperialism was "imposed on the Chinese people and the Indian people" by the British colonialists and was "never recognized by China." The editorial also condemned India for being instigated by the imperialists and has become the chief culprit of the conflict. At the same time, the editorial also criticized the Communist Party of India for slipping into chauvinism and harming proletarian internationalism. [144] The Chinese government issued a statement on the Cuban Missile Crisis on the same day, which stated that it "fully supports" the position of the Soviet government that it "will do everything possible to smash the aggressive conspiracy of the US imperialist bloc" announced on October 23, stating that China wants " Together with socialist countries and all countries that love national peace, we must resolutely fight against such war provocative acts of U.S. imperialism."[145] China supported the Cuban issue in its own way, but it was against Khrushchev’s The request did not respond. [146] Therefore, in the view of Soviet leaders, such support is far from enough.

  The Cuban Missile Crisis ended with the Soviet Union withdrawing missiles from Cuba. A letter from Castro to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 27, 1962 may be a key factor that prompted Khrushchev to finally make up his mind to withdraw the missile. In his letter, Castro believed that the war would begin in the next few hours, and that their people were prepared to repel the offensive of imperialist aggression, and they would rather die than surrender. Castro especially emphasized: “In the face of the unavoidable conflict with the United States, the imperialists must not be allowed to hit us, first of all to carry out a nuclear attack on us.” Khrushchev was particularly shocked by this, he believed that Kas Trot’s idea was “just crazy.” The Soviet Union “deployed missiles there to prevent attacks on the island, to defend Cuba, and to defend socialism. But he was fine. Not only did he not want to live, but he had to get us in.” . [147] The

  Soviet Union's decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba directly led to China's fierce attack on Soviet policy. Regarding the Soviet Union’s policy changes in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Chen Yi made it clear to the Chargé d’affaires of the Cuban Embassy in China on November 1, 1962: Cuba’s destiny rests in the hands of the Cuban people, not in the hands of any other country. Cuba’s independence and sovereignty cannot be negotiated, and Cuba’s freedom and rights must never be traded. It is people, not weapons, that are decisive in the revolutionary struggle. [148] Subsequently, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a series of statements and articles, criticizing the Soviet Union’s policy stance by praising Cuba’s anti-American struggle. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized that the Cuban people’s victorious anti-American struggle will have a profound impact, and praised the Cuban people for "adhering to the correct Marxist-Leninist revolutionary spirit, adhering to the revolutionary principle of not begging for peace from imperialism, and mobilizing the people. The correct stand for carrying out the revolutionary struggle led the Cuban revolution from victory to new victory”, “showing the revolutionary spirit of never surrendering to the invaders and strong pressure, and defending the honor of the socialist country.” Criticism of the Soviet Union against China. In response, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China claimed, “We neither demanded that nuclear weapons be brought into Cuba, nor did we obstruct the withdrawal of so-called'offensive' weapons from Cuba. Therefore, for us, there is nothing'adventurism' at all, let alone what we want. "Drag the world into a thermonuclear war"."[149] In these statements, editorials, and articles, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made no mention of the Soviet Union's role in ending the Cuban missile crisis.

  On November 5, Pravda issued a statement once again stating that the Soviet Union held a neutral position on the Sino-Indian border issue. In this regard, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believes that Khrushchev initially tried to use the Soviet Union to support China's position on the Sino-Indian border dispute in exchange for China's support for the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis. Therefore, in the short term, he took a wait-and-see attitude towards the Sino-Indian border conflict. Regarding the reason why Khrushchev launched a new round of anti-China wave after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believes that this is not only because this is the Caribbean crisis has passed, and he no longer needs Chinese support, but also because he is in the Caribbean. Lost face in the crisis, very embarrassed, and angered China." [150]

  Another important factor affecting China's diplomatic decision-making in the process of the Sino-Indian border conflict is the different responses of Asian and African countries. The only Asian countries that publicly expressed support for China during the conflict were Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, and Pakistan. On November 22, 1962, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a statement in support of China. On November 24, Ho Chi Minh wrote to Liu Shaoqi and Nehru respectively, clarifying Vietnam’s position. In a letter to Nehru, Ho Chi Minh said: “I think the Chinese government’s recent decisions and measures being implemented to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue through peaceful means are the most reasonable. The Vietnamese people and the peoples of Asia and Africa are in harmony with each other. The peace-loving people of the world expect the Indian government and the Chinese government to work together to restore peace on the border between the two countries." [151] On November 23, the North Korean government issued a statement declaring that the Sino-Indian border issue is imperialism imposed on China and India. A product of its aggressive policy, China has made consistent efforts to resolve this issue peacefully. The measures taken by China show that China cherishes the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples. The North Korean government hopes that the Indian government will accept the Chinese government’s proposal without delay. On December 8, Kim Il Sung sent a letter to Zhou Enlai, once again expressing North Korea’s position. [152] Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan (Mohammad Ayub Khan) pointed out in a speech at the National Assembly of Pakistan: India’s actions led to the conflict. The Myanmar government also expressed support for China. [153]

  Some Asian countries remain neutral on the Sino-Indian border conflict. The Ceylon government issued a statement that the “armed conflict between India and China is a tragedy for Asia and the world”. The King of Nepal said: "Mr. Nehru has been grey-haired in his life's efforts to maintain peace. I think he will not fall behind in solving this problem this time. I also know China who believes in Panchahira very well. Prime Minister." The Mongolian government issued a statement expressing "deep regret, serious anxiety and anxiety" over the Sino-Indian border conflict. The statement expressed a "warm welcome" to China's "active attitude" of unilateral ceasefire and retreat. At the same time, it was "satisfactory to learn" Nehru's speech in the Indian Parliament. The King of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah (Mohammed Zahir Shah) and Indonesia have both expressed their willingness to mediate the Sino-Indian conflict. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia declared that as "friends of these two great nations", Cambodia will not stand on either side. [154]

  However, many countries oppose China's actions and sympathize with and support India. A total of 75 countries have given India open support. Commonwealth member states such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus sent letters and telegrams to India to express their sympathy and support. Japan issued a reply letter from Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda to Nehru on November 5, 1962. In his reply, Ikeda stated: “The large-scale military operation of the Communist China as a means of resolving the border dispute with your country is very regrettable. This action constitutes a threat to peace in Asia and in fact to world peace.” On November 3, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Assadullah Alam, in his reply to Nehru, believed that China's actions were "aggression" and expressed that the Iranian people and government "sympathize" with India. The Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos, Souvanna Phouma, wrote to Nehru, asking Nehru to rest assured that Laos expressed “full sympathy for India at this moment of serious national crisis.”

  Thailand believes that China has provoked border conflicts "because of domestic difficulties and attempts to divert the attention of the people in the country" and stated that Thailand will "continuously and wholeheartedly support India." Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal wrote to Nehru: The Philippines supports India to its fullest. "This kind of aggression is part of Communist China’s behavior. It often threatens not only India’s security but also other Asian countries. Security.” Malaysia also declared its support for India. [155]

  Countries in the Middle East support India almost completely. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion replied to Nehru: “We deeply admire India’s restraint and patience during the serious stage of the border dispute.” The Jordanian Prime Minister wrote to Nehru, saying: When you were invaded by the Communist Party of China, I was deeply concerned about you." The Emir of Kuwait called Nehru and said, "This hostilities have been commendably focused on fighting for India in your great country. It is unfortunate to happen when progress and prosperity happen.” At the same time, Kuwait made it clear to India, “India currently has the arduous task of expelling a powerful country from the border. We are sure that India will win the struggle.”[156] Most countries in Africa also clearly stand on India's side. The United Arab Republic not only believes that India’s withdrawal proposal is valid, but it also sells light weapons to India. Sudan condemned China's "aggression." The Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China "used the army to deal with" India, thus "ignoring the Bandung Principle and the Principle of Peaceful Coexistence." The Nigerian Prime Minister wrote to Nehru, saying, "The theory that China's power is truth is untenable, and any country that believes in this statement should be condemned." The Prime Minister of Rhodesia said: "My government has been firmly on India's side in the current struggle." Ethiopia referred to China as the "aggressor." Uganda believes that "no one will support China's entry into the United Nations until the fighting ceases." Only a few African countries such as Algeria, Guinea, Ghana and other countries support China. [157]

  At the same time, the reaction of the Indian Communist Party to the Sino-Indian border conflict has also confirmed in practice an important theory of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, that is, the necessity of a resolute struggle against revisionism in the international communist movement. In February 1961, the National Committee of the Communist Party of India passed the resolution "On the Border Dispute between India and China", which publicly stated the position of the Indian Communist Party on the Sino-Indian boundary issue and declared that the Indian Communist Party "supports the traditional boundary line in the western sector and supports McMahon. The line is the de facto boundary line of the eastern section.” On August 19, 1962, the National Committee of the Communist Party of India in Hyderabad passed the “Resolution on the Status Quo of the India-China Border Issue and Solutions”, and firmly supported Nehru’s policy. On October 17 of the same year, the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India announced again in a resolution passed in New Delhi: “The Communist Party of India has always believed that the McMahon Line is the border of India. Therefore, it is reasonable to take all necessary measures to defend it.”

  China and India After the border conflict broke out, the position of the Indian Communist Party became clearer. On November 1, 1962, the National Committee of the Communist Party of India passed the resolution on "National Emergency Caused by Chinese Aggression" proposed by the party chairman Danji. The resolution criticized China’s military actions, “calling on the people of all walks of life in India to unite to defend the motherland and resist Chinese aggression. The Communist Party and all the patriotic people of our country work hand in hand to support the prime minister’s exciting call for the nation to unite in defense of the country.” Therefore, India The National Committee of the Communist Party "calls on every party member and every party supporter to step up their efforts to support the country’s defense." When the Indian Communist Party passed this resolution, among the 93 members present at the meeting, 23 voted against and 3 abstained. Seventeen members of the National Committee did not attend the meeting. On November 14, Danji once again clearly expressed the above-mentioned position of the CPI in his congratulatory letter to Nehru. Danji emphasized: "At this moment of serious crisis caused by Chinese aggression, the whole country has united around you like one person to defend its honor, integrity and sovereignty. The Communist Party of India pledges to support your defense without reservation. Policy and national unity policy.” On December 1, the Central Executive Committee of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India passed the resolution "Unite for National Defense and National Policy." The resolution said: "The way the Chinese launched and carried out offensives and invasions shows that they were carefully prepared for a long time... The behavior of the Chinese leadership and government clearly violated all the policies and principles of international communism." At this Executive Committee meeting, only 17 of the 30 members attended the meeting. [158] The split of the Communist Party of India became public.

  At the same time, the Indian Communist Party also expressed its position to the Soviet Union. On October 26, 1962, the General Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India (EMNambudiripad) had a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, saying that the article in Pravda and the letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU had many issues. The viewpoints are different from the past, and even contradictory. The Indian Communist Party believes that the McMahon Line is the real dividing line between the two countries. Many ordinary party members and leaders of some organizations in the Indian Communist Party also clearly believe that China should bear the responsibility for the initiation and intensification of border conflicts. South Boudirabad further pointed out: The publication of this article will set off a new wave of anti-Soviet in India, turning anti-China sentiment into anti-Soviet, and then expanding to oppose the entire socialist country. He also emphasized that due to the influence of Pravda’s article, many neutral countries will also strongly urge India to resolve border conflicts peacefully as soon as possible, and the Indian government will therefore conclude that only the West is the true friend. South Boudirabad expressed that he very much hopes to help the Communist Party of India understand the true views of the leaders of the CPSU on Chinese comrades, and hopes that through the help of the CPSU, without harming Nehru’s prestige and India’s national interests, Hold peace talks with Nehru without resorting to armed confrontation. At the same time, the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India unanimously believes that if the Chinese leaders also hold the desire to resolve the border conflict peacefully to negotiate with India, it will be of great significance to promote world peace and promote the anti-imperialist struggle of the entire progressive force. [159]

  Regarding the attitude of the Indian Communist Party on the Sino-Indian border conflict, the response of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was tough and clear. The People’s Daily editorial on March 11, 1963 pointed out: “In the past year, the revisionist group headed by Danji has used the opportunity of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlord ruling group to launch a large-scale anti-China, anti-community and anti-people movement. , Gained the leadership of the Communist Party of India. They betrayed Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, betrayed the revolutionary cause of the Indian proletariat and the Indian people, embarked on the road of national chauvinism and class surrenderism, within the Communist Party of India Cause serious chaos.” The editorial further emphasized: “The Danji Group is another mirror. This mirror reflects how a Communist Party leader in a capitalist country has embarked on the road of revisionism and slipped along this road. Go down and become the servant and tail of the bourgeoisie." [160]

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